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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tradition of interpreting "public purpose" on an ad hoc basis8" to meet the
dynamic needs of the community.
(Mrs.) Josephine Y. Icing
THE FORMULA FOR COMPENSATION IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS-REPRODUCTION COST

LESS

DEPRECIATION

The instant appeal is a consolidation of four cases concerning the claims
for the value of trade fixtures by the tenants of a building being taken in
condemnation. Each tenant owns a separate and different business. In each
claim, the tenants seek to have the value of their trade fixtures determined by
their reproduction cost less depreciation. In the first two cases, one concerning
a pharmacy' and the other concerning a dress cutting shop,2 the Court of
Claims dismissed the claims of the tenants. The Appellate Division reversed
this decision and allowed the claims. In the' second two cases, concerning a
supermarket 3 and a dry cleaning shop, 4 and which were decided subsequent to
the Appellate Division's disposition of the first two cases, the Court of Claims
allowed the claims for compensation for the trade fixtures based on their reproduction cost less depreciation. This decision of the Court of Claims was
affirmed by the Appellate Division. From the adverse rulings of the Appellate
Division, the State of New York appealed to the Court of Appeals. Held,
affirmed unanimously, the means of evaluating the fixtures depends upon the
facts of the case under consideration and in the present case, the fixtures being
attached to the realty and either custom built or expressly adapted thereto,
it was proper to evaluate the fixtures according to their reproduction cost less
depreciation; it is also proper to consider the fixtures apart from the realty as
a whole for the purposes of evaluation. Marraro v. State of New York, 12
N.Y.2d 285, 189 N.E.2d 606, 239 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1963).
The law of fixtures gradually became established in order to lessen the
harsh effect of the old common law rule5 that everything attached to the fee
became part of it and that a person having an interest amounting to less than
a fee in the land would lose the value of any improvements he had made
thereon. 6 It is now established that, even when the buildings or fixtures are so
attached to the land that title would pass with a conveyance of the land, as
between the landlord and the tenant, they remain the personal property of the
tenant, and, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the fixtures may
35. Matter of New York City Housing Authority v. Muller 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d
153 (1936).
1. Marraro v. State, 15 A.D.2d 707, 223 N.Y.S.2d 556 (3d Dep't 1962).
2. Caruso v. State, 15 A.D.2d 687 (3d Dep't 1962).
3. Aber-Dulberg, Inc. v. State, 15 A.D.2d 712, 223 N.Y.S.2d 853 (3d Dep't 1962).
4. East Hills Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. State, 15 A.D.2d 713, 223 N.Y.S.2d 853 (3d
Dep't 1962).
5. Matter of the Mayor, 39 App. Div. 589, 57 N.Y. Supp. 657 (1st Dep't 1899).
6. 2 Kent, Commentaries 343 (12th ed. 1873).
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be removed by the tenant at any time during the term of the lease or at the
expiration thereof unless the removal of the fixtures could not be accomplished
without injury to the freehold. 7 The benefits and protections of this rule are
intended to inure solely to the tenant and cannot be relied upon by the condemnor. Fixtures must be treated as part of the real property in determining the value of the land being condemned and as such the value of the
fixtures must be included in the award.8 It being established that the condemnor
of real property must provide compensation for all buildings and fixtures attached to the land, the only question, remaining is that of evaluation. Generally,
the unit rule is followed in establishing the value of fixtures and buildings. This
rule is just what it implies: The value of the buildings and fixtures is determined
by the amount by which the value of the land is enhanced by the presence of
the buildings and fixtures thereon. In other words, the value of the land without the fixtures and buildings is subtracted from the value of the land with the
fixtures and buildings, and the difference is the value of the buildings and
fixtures.9
In New York, the prevailing view is that the value of fixtures must be
included in a condemnation award in accordance with the unit rule.' 0 Though
New York has generally observed the unit rule, the courts have not always felt
constrained to do so. The following is an example of the court's reluctance to
be committed to any single mode of evaluation: "Each case necessarily involves different facts and must be considered by itself. Only a few general
rules apply on the question of valuation in condemnation proceedings, and even
these may yield to exceptional circumstances."" It has also been held in New
York that, in determining the amount to which fixtures enhance the value of
land, evidence of the reproduction cost of the fixtures less depreciation is admissible. 12 It is also clearly established that if the fixtures taken by the condemnor in a condemnation proceeding are owned by the tenant, then the
13
tenant is entitled to compensation for them.
In the instant case the Court deviated slightly from the established law in
the State of New York by allowing the trade fixtures of the claimants to be
evaluated as separate entities rather than as part of the building, i.e., by how
much they enhance the value of the building. The Court recognized the unusual
7. Matter of City of New York, 192 N.Y. 295, 84 N.E. 1105 (1908); Baker v.
McClurg, 198 Ill.
28, 64 N.E. 701 (1902); Collamore v. Gillis, 149 Mass. 578, 22 N.E.
46 (1889).
8. E.g., United States v. Lot 27, 157 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Gilbert v. State
of Arizona, 85 Ariz. 321, 338 P.2d 787 (1957); Bales v. Wichita Midland Valley R.R., 92
Kan. 771, 141 Pac. 1009 (1914); Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston & P.R. Corp.,
209 Mass. 298, 95 N.E. 887 (1911); Poillon v. Gerry, 179 N.Y. 14, 71 N.E. 262 (1904).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Seagren, 50 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Matter of City
of New York (Allen St.), 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931); Los Angeles v. Hughes, 202
Cal. 731, 262 Pac. 737 (1927).
10. Matter of City of New York (Allen St.), supra note 9.
11. Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 546, 148 N.E. 668, 672 (1925).
12. Matter of City of New York, 198 N.Y. 84, 91 N.E. 278 (1910).
13. Matter of City of New York (Allen St.), 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931).
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circumstance present in this case: that there were a number of tenants having
diverse businesses in the same building. Generally, cases involving evaluations
of fixtures have been concerned with situations in which the building condemned
was occupied by one type of business such as a factory or warehouse. The Court
found that the unique situation existing in this case warranted a departure from
the established methods of evaluation in eminent domain actions. Support for
this position can be found in the following statement:
Indeed, we think that it is an undue simplification to extract from the
books any "Unit Rule" whatever, in the sense of general authoritative
directions. What has happened, so far as we can see is that, as different
situations have arisen, the courts have dealt with them as the specific
facts demanded. 14
In view of the above statement, combined with the obvious injustice that would
result to the claimants if the unit rule were adhered to, the Court was drawn
to the conclusion that it would be just and proper in the present cases to
evaluate the fixtures separately, and that in determining their value evidence
of the reproduction cost less depreciation was sufficient.
Though the decision in the instant case does not stray far from former
decisions regarding the evaluation of fixtures, it does create a new rule. The
results obtained in the instant case do seem just and proper, but the same result
could have been reached without developing a new rule of law. If the issues
had been viewed as involving the admission of evidence, the Court could have
resolved the case by relying upon existing decisions. The Court has previously
held that a tenant, if the owner of the fixtures, is entitled to recover their value, 15
and it has also held that, in determining the amount by which the fixtures
enhance the value of the land, evidence of their reproduction cost less depreciation is admissible. 16 By combining these two propositions the same result
could have been reached. Nevertheless, the present decision indicates that the
Court is not disposed toward inertness. The Court has probably reached an
adequate solution to the ever growing problem of determining condemnation
awards in situations where there are a number of distinct businesses being conducted on one parcel of condemned land by various tenants.
William F. Kirk
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On July 14, 1959, the town board of Islip, passed a resolution to acquire
certain real property within the town limits for the purpose of establishing a
public parking lot and bathing beach. Concurrently, the board resolved to
finance the acquisition by the issuance of town bonds in the amount of $12,000
14. United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d 526, 528 (2d Cir. 1948).
15. Matter of City of New York (Allen St.), 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931).
16. Matter of City of New York (Alien St.), supra note 15.
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